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OPINION OF ADVOCATE GENERAL
STIX-HACKL
delivered on 8 June 2004 [\(1\)](#)

Case C-444/02

Fixtures Marketing Ltd
v
Organismos prognostikon agonon podofairou (OPAP)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling from Monomeles Protodikio Athinon (Greece))

(Directive 96/9/EC – Databases – Legal protection – Sui generis right – Beneficiaries – Substantial investment – Obtaining, verification and presentation of the contents of a database – (In)substantial part of the contents of a database – Extraction and re-utilisation – Normal exploitation – Unreasonable prejudice to the legitimate interests of the maker – Substantial change to the contents of a database – Sport – Betting)

I – Preliminary observations

1. This reference for a preliminary ruling is one of four parallel sets of proceedings [\(2\)](#) concerning the interpretation of Directive 96/9/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 1996 on the legal protection of databases [\(3\)](#) ('the Directive'). Like the other cases, this case concerns the so-called sui generis right and its scope in the area of sporting bets.

II – Legal background

A – *Community law*

2. Article 1 of the Directive contains provisions on the scope of the Directive. It provides inter alia:

`1.

This Directive concerns the legal protection of databases in any form.

2.

For the purposes of this Directive, "database" shall mean a collection of independent works, data or other materials arranged in a systematic or methodical way and individually accessible by electronic or other means.'

3. Chapter III regulates the sui generis right in Articles 7 to 11. Article 7, which concerns the object of protection, provides inter alia:

`1.

Member States shall provide for a right for the maker of a database which shows that there has been qualitatively and/or quantitatively a substantial investment in either the obtaining, verification or presentation of the contents to prevent extraction and/or re-utilisation of the whole or of a substantial part, evaluated qualitatively and/or quantitatively, of the contents of that database.

2.

For the purposes of this Chapter:

(a)

"extraction" shall mean the permanent or temporary transfer of all or a substantial part of the contents of a database to another medium by any means or in any form;

(b)

"re-utilisation" shall mean any form of making available to the public all or a substantial part of the contents of a database by the distribution of copies, by renting, by on-line or other forms of transmission. The first sale of a copy of a database within the Community by the rightholder or with his consent shall exhaust the right to control resale of that copy within the Community;

Public lending is not an act of extraction or re-utilisation.

3. The right referred to in paragraph 1 may be transferred, assigned or granted under contractual licence.
...
5. The repeated and systematic extraction and/or re-utilisation of insubstantial parts of the contents of the database implying acts which conflict with a normal exploitation of that database or which unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the maker of the database shall not be permitted.'
4. Article 8, which governs the rights and obligations of lawful users, provides in paragraph 1:
'1. The maker of a database which is made available to the public in whatever manner may not prevent a lawful user of the database from extracting and/or re-utilising insubstantial parts of its contents, evaluated qualitatively and/or quantitatively, for any purposes whatsoever. Where the lawful user is authorised to extract and/or re-utilise only part of the database, this paragraph shall apply only to that part.'
5. Article 9 provides that Member States may provide for exceptions to the sui generis right.
6. Article 10, which concerns the term of protection, provides in paragraph 3:
'Any substantial change, evaluated qualitatively or quantitatively, to the contents of a database, including any substantial change resulting from the accumulation of successive additions, deletions or alterations, which would result in the database being considered to be a substantial new investment, evaluated qualitatively or quantitatively, shall qualify the database resulting from that investment for its own term of protection'.

B – National law

7. The Directive was implemented in Greek law by Law No 2819/00. According to Article 7B of the explanatory report to that Law 'the need for protection of databases stems from the fact that the making of databases requires the investment of considerable human, technical and financial resources while such databases can be copied or accessed at a fraction of the cost needed to design them independently.' Under Article 7E of the explanatory report, in addition to the right of intellectual property a sui generis right is recognised in favour of the maker of the databases in order to prevent the extraction or re-utilisation of a substantial part of the content of the database without its permission.

III – Facts and main proceedings

A – General facts

8. In England professional football in the top divisions is organised by The Football Association Premier League Limited and The Football League Limited and in Scotland by The Scottish Football League. The Premier League and the Football League (comprising Division One, Division Two and Division Three) cover four leagues in total. Before the start of each season, fixture lists are drawn up for the matches to be played in the various divisions during the season. The data are stored electronically and are accessible individually. The fixture lists are set out inter alia in printed booklets, both chronologically and by reference to each team participating in the relevant league. The pairs are indicated as X v Y (for example, Southampton v Arsenal). Around 2 000 matches are played during each season over a period of 41 weeks.

9. The organisers of English and Scottish football retained a Scottish company, Football Fixtures Limited, to handle the exploitation of the fixtures lists through licensing etc. Football Fixtures Limited, in turn, assigned its rights to manage and operate outside the United Kingdom to Fixtures Marketing Limited ('Fixtures').

B – Specific facts

10. Fixtures brought a number of actions against the limited company Organismos Prognostikon Agonon Podofairou AE ('OPAP'). It claims that OPAP unlawfully and without the permission of the English and Scottish associations which are the makers and the operators of lists of football fixtures in England and Scotland, repeatedly extracts a substantial number of pairings of football teams playing against each other and transfers them to its internet sites 'Pame Stoichima', 'Podosfairo Kathe Mera', 'Chryso Podosfairo' and 'Propo' which distribute them and make them available to the Greek public, thereby infringing the sui generis right of the companies represented by Fixtures. They cite the urgency of the situation in support of their application for interim measures specifically to prohibit OPAP, on pain of a fine for any future infringement, from infringing their rights over the lists of football fixtures in question in England and Scotland, together with publication at the defendant's expense of the decision in the Athens daily press.

IV – The questions referred

11. The Monomeles Protodikio Athinon (Single-Judge Court of First Instance, Athens) seeks a preliminary ruling from the Court of Justice on the following questions:

1. What is the definition of database and what is the scope of Directive 96/9/EC and in particular Article 7 thereof which concerns the sui generis right?

- 2.

In the light of the definition of the scope of the directive, do lists of football fixtures enjoy protection as databases over which there is a sui generis right in favour of the maker and under what conditions?

3.

How exactly is the database right infringed and is it protected in the event of rearrangement of the contents of the database?

V – Admissibility

12. In the view of the Finnish Government the order for reference does not fulfil the criteria laid down in the case-law of the Court of Justice for the admissibility of questions referred for a preliminary ruling. For instance, insufficient details are given of the position under national law. Moreover, reference is made to Article 3 rather than Article 7 of the Directive which is the relevant article here. Further the facts were given only in the summary of Fixtures' arguments. There is thus no description of OPAP. Nor is the connection between the legal provisions and the facts made clear. The information given was so inadequate that the Finnish Government could not give a detailed opinion.

13. The Commission merely observes that the the information provided by the national court did not allow the provisions of the Directive to be applied to the specific facts. However, the Commission expressed no doubts regarding admissibility.

14. According to settled case-law, it is solely for the national courts before which actions are brought, and which must bear the responsibility for the subsequent judicial decision, to determine in the light of the special features of each case both the need for a preliminary ruling in order to enable them to deliver judgment and the relevance of the questions which they submit to the Court. Where the questions referred involve the interpretation of Community law, the Court is, in principle, obliged to give a ruling. [\(4\)](#)

15. The Court may refuse to rule on a question referred for a preliminary ruling by a national court only where it is quite obvious that the interpretation of Community law that is sought bears no relation to the actual facts of the main action or its purpose, where the problem is hypothetical, or where the Court does not have before it the factual or legal material necessary to give a useful answer to the questions submitted to it. [\(5\)](#)

16. In the present case it is not clear that the questions referred by the national court meet one of those descriptions. First, it cannot be assumed that the interpretation of Community law that is sought bears no relation to the actual facts of the main action or its purpose since the decision in the main proceedings turns inter alia on the the meaning of the term database in Article 1 of the Directive. Second, the referring court has given the Court of Justice – albeit in summary form – all the material it needs to give a useful answer to the questions referred to it.

17. According to settled case-law, the need to provide an interpretation of Community law which will be of use to the national court makes it necessary that the national court define the factual and legal context of the questions it is asking or, at the very least, explain the factual circumstances on which those questions are based. [\(6\)](#) Given that it is the role of the national court to apply the law to the facts, the information about the factual and legal framework is sufficient to enable the Court of Justice to give a useful answer to the questions referred. The order for reference even gives information which is not contained in the order for reference in the parallel Case C-46/02, which is not criticised by the Finnish Government, that is to say information on the relationship between Fixtures and Football Fixtures Limited. The information given about the activities of OPAP is sufficient.

18. The information provided in orders for reference must not only be such as to enable the Court to reply usefully but must also enable the governments of the Member States and other interested parties to submit observations pursuant to Article 23 of the Statute of the Court of Justice. It is the Court's duty to ensure that that possibility is safeguarded, bearing in mind that, by virtue of the abovementioned provision, only the orders for reference are notified to the interested parties. [\(7\)](#)

19. It is clear from the many observations submitted – not least by the Finnish Government – under Article 23 of the Statute of the Court of Justice, that the information in the order for reference amply enabled those submitting them to give a useful opinion on the questions referred to the Court.

20. The Court has also held that it is essential that the national court should give at the very least some explanation of the reasons for the choice of the Community provisions which it requires to be interpreted and of the link it establishes between those provisions and the national legislation applicable to the dispute. [\(8\)](#)

21. According to the case-law of the Court, it is sufficient if, on the facts as described by the national court, it appears likely that the facts of the main proceedings may be governed by the provisions of which an interpretation is sought. The Court can provide an interpretation of Community law which may assist the national court in deciding the case in the main proceedings and it may therefore deem it necessary to consider provisions of Community law to which the national court has not referred in the text of its question. [\(9\)](#)

22. In the light of the foregoing observations, the questions referred by the Monomeles Protodikio Athinon are in principle admissible.

23. In many respects the questions referred do not so much concern the interpretation of Community law, in other words the Directive, as the application of the directive to a specific set of facts. That being so, I must endorse the Commission's view that, in proceedings on a reference for a preliminary ruling under Article 234

EC, that is not the role of the Court of Justice but that of the national court and that the Court of Justice must confine itself to interpreting Community law in the case before it.

24. According to the settled case-law of the Court of Justice, in proceedings under Article 234 EC, which is based on a clear separation of functions between the national courts and the Court of Justice, any assessment of the facts in the case is a matter for the national court. (10)

25. The Court therefore has no jurisdiction to give a ruling on the facts in the main proceedings or to apply the rules of Community law which it has interpreted to national measures or situations, since those questions are matters for the exclusive jurisdiction of the national court. The analysis of individual events in connection with the database at issue in these proceedings thus requires a factual assessment, which it is for the national court to make. (11) That apart, the Court has jurisdiction to answer the questions referred.

VI – Assessment of the merits

26. The questions referred for a preliminary ruling by the national court relate to the interpretation of a series of provisions of the Directive and in the main to the construction of certain terms. The matters addressed fall within different fields and must be dealt with accordingly. While some of the questions concern the scope *ratione materiae* of the Directive, others relate to the requirements for granting the sui generis right and its content.

A – Scope ratione materiae: the term 'database' (first and second questions)

27. Many of the parties submitting observations referred in their written observations on the term 'database' within the meaning of Article 1(2) of the Directive to criteria which are relevant only to the determination of the object of sui generis protection.

28. The interpretation of the term 'database' within the meaning of Article 1(2) constitutes one of the fundamental requirements for the application of the Directive and thus for its scope *ratione materiae* altogether. That scope must be distinguished from the scope *ratione materiae* of the sui generis right, that is to say the 'object of protection' provided for by Article 7 of the Directive. Although that provision is connected with the legal definition of 'database' it lays down a series of additional conditions regarding the object of the sui generis protection. That means that not all databases within the meaning of Article 1(2) are at the same time objects of protection within the meaning of Article 7 of the Directive.

29. That distinction is also made in the recitals in the preamble to the Directive. The 17th recital concerns the term database and the 19th recital the sui generis right. Admittedly, the examples given there were not the best ones to illustrate the different meanings: a recording of certain artistic musical works does not even constitute a database, while a compilation of musical recordings does not fall within the objects of protection covered. However, that is clear from the very fact that a database does not even exist in such a case.

30. Falling within the definition of a 'database' is thus a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for the grant of the sui generis right laid down by Article 7.

31. An initial reference point for the interpretation of the term 'database' lies in the rules of international law which serve to provide guidance. The first such rule is Article 10(2) of the Agreement on Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs Agreement), (12) although that provision does not contain all the criteria in Article 1(2) of the Directive. Then there is Article 2(5) of the Berne Convention as revised. On the other hand rules of international law which are more recent than the Directive cannot provide an adequate yardstick. That is true, for example, of Article 5 of the WCT WIPO Copyright Treaty, which was not adopted until 1996. As is clear from the background to the adoption of the Directive and the Commission's documents in particular, the Directive was intended primarily to reflect the Berne Convention.

32. However, an interpretation in the light of the above rules of international law is not of much further use as regards the construction of the term database because Article 1(2) of the Directive contains a legal definition which, while not very precise, lays down several requirements. Their significance will be examined in greater detail below. However, it must be borne in mind that, although the Court of Justice can provide the national court with useful information for the solution of the case, it remains the task of the national court to apply the provisions of Community law or the provisions of national law transposing them, as interpreted by the Court of Justice, to the facts of the individual case.

33. The very structure of Article 1 of the Directive, which contains various rules on databases, points to a wide interpretation. Thus, Article 1(1) expressly provides that the Directive applies to 'databases in any form'. Moreover, the fact that Article 1(3) provides for an exception, namely for computer programmes, reinforces the case for a wide interpretation of the term 'database'.

34. The intention of the Community legislature, as demonstrated by the background to the adoption of the Directive, (13) can also be cited in support of a wide interpretation.

35. However, fulfilment of the three requirements laid down in Article 1(2) is essential for the definition of the term 'database'.

36. First 'a collection of *independent* works, data or other materials' (emphasis added) is required. The question whether the main proceedings concern data or materials need not be considered in greater depth, because in practice they concern either data, in the sense of combinations of signs representing facts, that is to say, elementary statements with potentially informative content, (14) or materials as recognisable entities.

37. In the absence of a clear provision to that effect in the Directive it is not necessary for a significant number of data or materials to be involved. A demand for such a provision by the Parliament was not taken up by either the Council or the Commission. Requirements of a quantitative nature, namely for 'a substantial investment,' are laid down only by Article 7(1) of the Directive.

38. Rather, in the present proceedings, it must be ascertained whether the requirement of independence of the data or materials is fulfilled.

39. That criterion should be understood as meaning that the data or materials must not be linked or must at least be capable of being separated without losing their informative content, (15) which is why sound or pictures from a film are not covered. One possible approach to interpretation is to focus not only on the mutual independence of the materials from one another but on their independence within a collection. (16)

40. Second, the Directive only covers collections which have been arranged systematically or methodically. In the 21st recital it is made clear that it is not necessary for those materials to have been physically stored. That requirement serves to exclude random accumulations of data and ensure that only planned collections of data are covered, (17) that is to say, data organised according to specific criteria. (18) It is sufficient if a structure is established for the data and they are organised only following application of the appropriate search programme, (19) and thus essentially through sorting and, possibly, indexation. Both statistical and dynamic (20) databases are covered.

41. Thirdly, Article 1(2) of the Directive requires that the data be 'individually accessible by electronic or other means.' Thus, mere storage of data is not covered by the term 'database' within the meaning of Article 1(2) of the Directive.

42. Accordingly, the term 'database' in Article 1(2) must be interpreted widely. However, the conditions regarding the object of protection laid down in Article 7(1) of the Directive entail limitations.

43. Certain Governments express the view that the selection or organisation of the contents of a database on sporting bets does not constitute an independent intellectual creation. In that connection it must be observed that creativity is not a defining characteristic of a database within the meaning of Article 1 of the Directive. Even in the light of the object of protection of the sui generis right it must be doubted whether creativity is a defining characteristic. In contrast, it is an essential condition for protection of a database by the copyright provided for in Chapter II of the Directive (Article 3 et seq.) that a database should be the author's own intellectual creation. Article 7(4) of the Directive provides that the sui generis right is to apply irrespective of the eligibility of that database or its contents for protection by copyright.

44. The object of protection of the sui generis right is different from that of copyright. The newly created right is intended, unlike copyright, which protects creative input, to protect investment. (21) Thus, there is a difference as regards the proprietor of the right. While the sui generis right protects the maker of a database, copyright – as the term itself (in German) indicates – protects the author of a work.

45. Some Governments have pointed out in their written observations that the database at issue in the proceedings is not systematically or methodically organised, because the teams are paired by drawing lots. In that connection it must be observed that the contents of the database do not only consist in data derived from drawing lots but that additional entries are made, such as place and time of the match.

B – Object of protection: Conditions (first and second questions referred)

46. In order to be covered by the sui generis right under Article 7 of the Directive a database must fall within the defining elements laid down by that provision. These proceedings concern the interpretation of some of those criteria.

47. In that connection, reference should be made to the legal debate on the question whether the sui generis right covers the creation, in the sense, essentially, of the activity of creating a database, or the outcome of that process. On that point, it must be observed that the Directive protects databases or their contents but not the information they contain as such. Ultimately it is thus a matter of protecting the product, while at the same time indirectly protecting the expenditure incurred in the process, in other words, the investment. (22)

48. The requirements laid down by Article 7 of the Directive must be read in conjunction with those laid down by Article 1(2). The resulting definition of the object of protection is narrower than that of 'database' in Article 1.

49. The sui generis right introduced by the Directive derives from the Scandinavian catalogue protection rights and the Dutch 'geschriftenbescherming'. However, that background must not mislead us into importing the thinking on those earlier provisions developed in academic writings and case-law into the Directive. Rather, the Directive should serve as a yardstick for the interpretation of national law, even in those Member States which had similar provisions before the Directive was adopted. In those Member States, too, the national legislation had to be brought into line with the precepts of the Directive.

1. 'Substantial investment'

50. A key term for the definition of the object of protection of the sui generis right is the expression 'substantial investment' in Article 7(1) of the Directive. The criterion is further qualified by the requirement that the investment be 'qualitatively and/or quantitatively' substantial. However, the Directive does not lay down legal definitions of those two alternatives. Academic legal writers have called for clarification of that point by

the Court of Justice. That demand is entirely justified since only such clarification will ensure an autonomous and uniform Community interpretation. It must, of course, not be forgotten that the application of the criteria for interpretation is ultimately a matter for the national court, which entails a risk of differing applications.

51. As is clear from the structure of Article 7(1) of the Directive, the term 'substantial investment' is to be construed in relative terms. According to the preamble to the Common Position, in which that provision was given its final version, the investments used to draw up and compile the contents of a database were to be protected. (23)

52. The investment must thus relate to certain activities connected with the making of a database. Article 7 lists the following three activities: obtaining, verification and presentation of the contents of a database. As those defining elements are the subject of another question referred, their meaning will not be considered in detail here.

53. It is made clear what type of investments may be covered by the 40th recital, the last sentence of which reads: 'such investment may consist of the implementation of financial resources and/or the expending of time, effort and energy.' According to the seventh recital, it is a matter of 'the investment of considerable human, technical and financial resources.'

54. Further, the term 'substantial' must also be construed in relative terms, first in relation to costs and their redemption (24) and secondly in relation to the scale, nature and contents of the database and the sector to which it belongs. (25)

55. Thus it is not only investments which have a high value in absolute terms that are protected. (26) On the other hand the criterion 'substantial' cannot be construed only in relative terms. The Directive requires an absolute lower threshold for investments worthy of protection as a sort of *de minimis* rule. (27) That is implied by the 19th recital, according to which the investment must be 'substantial enough.' (28) However that threshold should probably be set low. First, that is the implication of the 55th recital (29) in which there is no clarification as regards level. Secondly, it can be inferred from the fact that the Directive is intended to bring different systems into line. Thirdly, a lower limit that was too high would undermine the intended purpose of the Directive, which is to create incentives for investment.

56. Many of the parties submitting observations based their observations on the so-called 'spin-off theory' according to which by-products are not covered by the right. It is only permissible to protect profits which serve to repay the investment. Those parties pointed out that the database at issue in the proceedings was necessary for the organisation of sporting bets, that is to say, it was made for that purpose. The investment was for the purpose of organising bets and not, or not exclusively, for that of creating the database. The investment would have been made in any event, as there is an obligation to undertake such organisation. The database is thus merely a by-product on another market.

57. In the present proceedings it must thus be clarified whether and in what way the so-called 'spin-off theory' can be of relevance to the interpretation of the Directive and in particular of the sui generis right. In the light of the reservations expressed in these proceedings regarding the protection of databases which are mere by-products, a demystification of the 'spin-off theory' seems called for. This theory, leaving aside its origins at national level, can be traced back, first, to the purpose implied by the 10th to 12th recitals of the Directive, which is to provide incentives for investment by improving the protection of investment. However, it is also based on the idea that investments should be repaid by profits from the principal activity. The 'spin-off theory' is also bound up with the idea that the Directive only protects those investments which were necessary to obtain the contents of a database. (30) All these arguments have their value and must be taken into account in the interpretation of the Directive. However that must not result in the exclusion of every spin-off effect solely in reliance on a theory. The provisions of the Directive are and remain the decisive factor in its interpretation.

58. The solution to the legal issue in these proceedings turns on whether the grant of protection to a database depends on the intention of the maker or the purpose of the database, where these are not the same. In that connection, one could simply point out that the Directive makes no reference to the purpose of a database in either Article 1 or Article 7. If the Community legislature had wanted to lay down such a requirement, it would surely have done so. For both Article 1 and Article 7 demonstrate that the Community legislature was perfectly prepared to lay down a number of requirements. According to those requirements the purpose of the database is not a criterion for the assessment of the eligibility for protection of a database. Rather, the requirements laid down by Article 7 are decisive. The position is not altered by the 42nd recital which many of the parties submitting observations cite. First, that recital concerns the scope of the sui generis right and, secondly, here too, what is important is that the investment is not harmed.

59. However, even in the other recitals of the Directive which refer to investment and emphasise its importance, such as the 12th, 19th and 40th recitals, there is no suggestion that the protection of a database depends on its purpose.

60. Moreover, in practice there may be makers of databases who are pursuing several purposes in making a database. It may be that the investments made cannot be attributed to a certain single purpose or are not separable. In such a situation, the criterion of the purpose of a database would not provide an unequivocal solution. Either the investment would be protected independently of another purpose or it would be wholly unprotected because of the other purpose. The criterion of purpose thus proves either impracticable or

irreconcilable with the purpose of the Directive. Excluding the protection of databases which serve several purposes would run counter to the objective of providing incentives for investment. That would prove an enormous obstacle to investments in multifunctional databases.

61. The database at issue in the main proceedings is an example of a situation where the database is created for the additional purpose of organising fixture lists. Creating a separate – possibly almost identical – database would be contrary to fundamental economic principles and such a requirement cannot be inferred from the Directive.

62. It is to be determined whether there was a substantial investment in the main proceedings by the application of the above criteria to the specific facts. According to the distribution of responsibilities in a reference for a preliminary ruling under Article 234 EC, that is the task of the national court. In any event, the assessment of investments in the database must include the circumstances to be taken into account in drawing up the fixture lists, such as the attraction of the game for spectators, the interests of the bookmakers, marketing by associations, other events in the area on the planned date, the appropriate geographical distribution of the games and the avoidance of public order issues. Finally, the number of games must be taken into account in the assessment. The burden of proof of the investment made is on the party invoking the *sui generis* right.

2. 'Obtaining' within the meaning of Article 7(1) of the Directive

63. One issue in the present case is whether there was any 'obtaining' within the meaning of Article 7(1) of the Directive. That provision only protects investment in the 'obtaining', 'verification' or 'presentation' of the contents of a database.

64. We must base our discussion on the thrust of the protection conferred by the *sui generis* right, in other words the protection of the creation of a database. Creation can then be seen as an umbrella term for obtaining, verification and presentation. [\(31\)](#)

65. The main proceedings deal with an often discussed legal problem, that is to say whether, and, if so, under what conditions, and to what extent the Directive protects not only existing data but also data created by the maker of a database. If obtaining is only to relate to existing data, the protection of the investment would only cover such data. Thus, if we take that interpretation of obtaining as a basis, the protection of the database in the main proceedings depends on whether existing data were obtained.

66. However, if we take the umbrella-term creation, in other words the supplying of the database with content, [\(32\)](#) as a basis, both existing and newly created data could be covered. [\(33\)](#)

67. A comparison of the term 'obtaining' used in Article 7(1) with the activities listed in the 39th recital in the preamble to the Directive might shed some light. However, it must be pointed out at the start that there are divergences between the various language versions.

68. If we start with the term 'Beschaffung', used in the German version of Article 7(1), it can only concern existing data, as it can only apply to something which already exists. In that light *Beschaffung* is the exact opposite of *Erschaffung* (creation). Analysis of the wording of the Portuguese, French, Spanish and English versions, which are all based on the Latin 'obtenere', to receive, yields the same result. The Finnish and Danish versions also suggest a narrow interpretation. The wide interpretation of the English and German versions advocated by many parties to the proceedings is therefore based on an error.

69. Further assistance with the correct interpretation of 'obtaining' in the terms of Article 7(1) of the Directive might be provided by the 39th recital in the preamble, which is the introductory recital for the subject of the *sui generis* right. That recital lists only two activities in connection with the protected investments, that is to say 'obtaining' and 'collection' of the contents. However, here too, problems arise over the differences between the various language versions. In most versions, the same term is used for the first activity as that used in Article 7(1). Moreover, although the terms used do not always describe the same activity, they essentially concern the seeking and collecting of the contents of a database.

70. The language versions which use, in the 39th recital, two different terms from those used in Article 7(1) of the Directive are to be construed so that the two activities listed are viewed as subspecies of obtaining within the meaning of Article 7(1) of the Directive. Admittedly, that raises the question why the 39th recital only defines obtaining but not verification or presentation more precisely. The latter two terms appear first in the 40th recital.

71. On the other hand, the language versions which use the same term in the 39th recital as in Article 7(1) of the Directive will have to be construed so that the term obtaining in the 39th recital is understood in a narrower sense, whereas the term used in Article 7(1) of the Directive is to be understood in a wide sense, in other words as also encompassing the other activity listed in the 39th recital.

72. All the language versions thus allow of an interpretation according to which, although 'obtaining' within the meaning of Article 7(1) of the Directive does not cover the mere production of data, that is to say, the generation of data, [\(34\)](#) and thus not the preparatory phase, [\(35\)](#) where the creation of data coincides with its collection and screening, the protection of the Directive kicks in.

73. In that connection, it should be pointed out that the so-called 'spin-off theory' cannot apply. Nor can the objective pursued in obtaining the contents of the database be of any relevance. [\(36\)](#) That means that protection is also possible where the obtaining was initially for the purpose of an activity other than the

creation of a database. For the Directive also protects the obtaining of data where the data was not obtained for the purposes of a database. (37) That implies that an external database, which is derived from an internal database, should also be covered by protection.

74. It is the task of the national court, using the interpretation of the term 'obtaining' set out above, to assess the activities of Fixtures. It is primarily a matter of classifying the data and its handling from its receipt to its inclusion in the database at issue in the proceedings. That entails the assessment of the drawing up of the fixture lists, in other words, essentially tying up the pairings with the place and time of the individual games. The fact that the fixture list is the outcome of negotiation between several parties, in particular, the police, associations and fan clubs, suggests that the present case is concerned with existing data. The fact that, as many of the parties have pointed out, the data were obtained for a purpose other than the creation of a database similarly suggests that these are existing data.

75. However, even if those activities were classified as the creation of new data, there might be 'obtaining' within the meaning of Article 7(1) of the Directive. That would be the case if the creation of the data took place at the same time as its processing and was inseparable from it.

3. 'Verification' within the meaning of Article 7(1) of the Directive

76. The usefulness of the database for betting and for its economic exploitation depends on continuous monitoring of the contents of the database at issue in these proceedings. According to the case-file, the database is constantly checked for correctness. If such a check reveals the need for changes, the necessary adjustments are made.

77. The fact that some of those adjustments do not constitute verification of the contents of the database is not detrimental. In order for there to be an object which is covered by the sui generis right it is only necessary that many of the activities undertaken can be classified as verification within the meaning of Article 7(1) of the Directive and that the substantial investment should at least concern inter alia the part of the activities covered by Article 7.

4. 'Presentation' within the meaning of Article 7(1) of the Directive

78. The object of protection of the sui generis right is constituted by 'obtaining' and 'verification' of the contents of a database and also by its 'presentation'. That entails not only the presentation for users of the database, that is to say, the external format, but also the conceptual format, such as the structuring of the contents. An index and a thesaurus are generally used to assist with the processing of data. As is clear from the 20th recital, such materials relating to the interrogation of the database can enjoy the protection of the Directive. (38)

C – Content of the protected right

79. It must first be observed that, strictly speaking, the introduction of the sui generis right was intended not to harmonise existing law but to create a new right. (39) That right goes beyond previous distribution and reproduction rights. That should also be taken into account in the interpretation of prohibited activities. Accordingly, the legal definition in Article 7(2) of the Directive assumes particular importance.

80. At first sight Article 7 of the Directive contains two groups of prohibitions or, from the point of view of the person entitled, that is to say the maker of a database, two different categories of right. Whereas paragraph 1 lays down a right to prevent use of a substantial part of a database, paragraph 5 prohibits certain acts relating to insubstantial parts of a database. On the basis of the relationship between substantial and insubstantial, paragraph 5 can also be understood as an exception to the exception implied by paragraph 1. (40) Paragraph 5 is intended to prevent circumvention of the prohibition laid down by paragraph 1, (41) and can thus also be classified as a protection clause. (42)

81. Article 7(1) provides for a right of the maker to prevent certain acts. That entails a prohibition on such preventable acts. The preventable and thus prohibited acts are, first, extraction and, second, re-utilisation. Legal definitions of the terms 'extraction' and 're-utilisation' are given in Article 7(2) of the Directive.

82. However, the prohibition laid down by Article 7(1) is not absolute, but requires the whole or a substantial part of a database to have been affected by a prohibited act.

83. The two defining elements must therefore be examined on the basis of the criterion determining application of Article 7(1) and (5): 'substantial' or 'insubstantial' part as the case may be. Thereafter the prohibited acts under Article 7(1) and (5) are to be considered.

1. Substantial or insubstantial parts of a database (first and second questions referred

a) General observations

84. It was contended in the proceedings that Article 7(1) of the Directive only prohibits acts which entail that the data are arranged in as systematic or methodical a way and are as individually accessible as in the original database.

85. That argument must be understood as laying down a condition for the application of the sui generis right. Whether there is in fact any such condition must be determined on the basis of the provisions on the object of protection and in particular on the basis of the legal definition laid down in Article 7(2) of the acts prohibited under Article 7(1).

86. Neither Article 7(1) nor Article 7(5) of the Directive lays down the above condition expressly or makes any reference to it. Rather, the fact that express reference is made in Article 1(2) to arrangement 'in a

systematic or methodical way' whereas no such reference is made in Article 7 suggests the opposite conclusion, that is to say, that the Community legislature did not intend to make that criterion a condition for the application of Article 7.

87. Moreover, the very purpose of the Directive precludes such an additional criterion.

88. The protection provided for in Article 7 would be undermined by such an additional criterion because the prohibition laid down by that article could be circumvented by simple alteration of parts of the database.

89. The 38th recital in the preamble to the Directive demonstrates that the Directive was also intended to prohibit possible breaches consisting in the rearrangement of the contents of a database. That recital refers to that risk and to the inadequacy of copyright protection.

90. The purpose of the Directive is precisely the creation of a new right, and even the 46th recital cannot refute that as it concerns another aspect.

91. Even the 45th recital, according to which copyright protection is not to be extended to mere facts or data, does not support the argument for an additional criterion. That, of course, does not mean that the protection covers the data themselves or individual data. The object of protection is and remains the database.

92. Accordingly it must be considered that the fact of having the same systematic or methodical arrangement as the original database does not constitute a criterion for the determination of the legality of the actions taken in connection with the database. Therefore, the view that the Directive does not protect data which are compiled in an altered or differently structured way is fundament